


# Security Threats in Cyber Domain – view from EFIS


Kaupo Rosin

Director General




# Cyber Threat Landscape

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


# Understanding Cyber Espionage




- **Constant threat**
- **Targets: government institutions, critical information systems and entities, private sector, people**
- **The goal of the attackers is to stay hidden as long as possible in order to preserve access to the systems**

Stages of Russian special services' cyber espionage operation



# Understanding Cyber as a Means for Influence



Cyber-enabled information ops

- DDoS attacks, defacements, hack-and-leak *etc*
- Targets: government institutions, critical information systems and entities, private sector
- The goal of the attackers is to gain publicity, cause anxiety among citizens and undermine the target nation

Riigikontroll.ee

NoName057(16)

Риigиконтрoлл.еe

Не удается получить доступ к сайту  
Сайт [www.riigikontroll.ee](http://www.riigikontroll.ee) временно недоступен.  
Попытка сделать соединение:  
• Проверьте адрес сайта в Интернет.  
• Проверьте, активны ли прокси-сервера и брандауэры.  
• Выключите антивирусную программу в Windows.  
Иногда проблема может быть связана с DNS-сервером.

Сегодня мы отправились в путешествие по Эстонии 🇪🇪  
Сайт государственного контроля не проконтролировал свою устойчивость от ддос-атак, чем мы и воспользовались:

✖ <https://check-host.net/check-report/dc9d896k676>

🐻 Подписывайтесь на канал  
[NoName057\(16\)](#)

🐻 Вступайте в наш ддос-проект

🇺🇸 Победа За нами!

779 👁 13:47

# Understanding Cyber Sabotage


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Cyber sabotage

- **The goal is to disrupt critical services, stress society on a bigger scale**
- **Targets: energy, communication, military sectors**
- **Low number of incidents, but wide impact**

# How does Russia see the cyber domain?


- The West distinguishes between cyberattacks and influence operations
- Russia interprets them as a single concept – information confrontation – which consists of technical and psychological measures
- The Russian Armed Forces' doctrine: exert informational, technological and psychological influence on another country, protect Russia itself from such influences



Grisé, M., et al. Rivalry in the Information Sphere: Russian Conceptions of Information Confrontation. RAND Corporation (2022)

# Cyber in Ukraine

- **Ukraine has been a constant target of cyberattacks by Russian special services since 2014**
- **Cyber attacks intensified before the full-scale invasion and have been ongoing ever since**
- **DDoS attacks, defacements, data leaks, wipers, cyber espionage**
- **Targets: critical infrastructure, military systems, media, local governments *etc***
- **Russia's cyberattacks against Ukraine highly likely aimed to support its general goals**



# Ukraine's resilience in cyberspace

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- **Ukraine's resilience in cyberspace has been remarkable**
- **Russia underestimated the resilience of Ukraine's cyberspace and the help it receives from Western countries and cybersecurity companies**
- **Ukrainian society remains united and trusts its government despite threats posted on social media and data leaks**






# Malicious Cyber Activities Outside Ukraine

Increased cyber threat level for Estonia and other Western countries due to:

- possible spill-over effect from cyber attacks against Ukraine;
- becoming a target because of the support for Ukraine.

Malicious activities of the „hactivists“:

- constant cyber attacks against the Western countries since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine;
- the impact as high as promoted by the hackers;
- waves of cyber attacks often as a reaction to certain political activities or decisions disliked by Russia;
- main purpose is psychological/influential.



On 7 September, the Information System Authority published a threat assessment highlighting the still ongoing DDoS attacks and the increased risk of website defacement.

# View Forward

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- **Other cyber threat actors of concern**
- **China cyber actors have shown more interest in Europe over the past years**
- **Deny hacktivists wider publicity, as that is their main goal (so far)**
- **The cyberspace is of global nature and cooperation between the civil, military and private sector is crucial**





# Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service